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Abstract 
We measure how pass-through varies with competition in isolated oligopolistic markets with captive 
consumers. Using daily pricing data from gas stations, we study how unanticipated and exogenous changes 
in excise duties (which vary across different petroleum products) are passed through to consumers in 
markets with different numbers of retailers. We find that pass-through increases from 0.44 in monopoly 
markets to 1 in markets with four or more competitors and remains constant thereafter. Moreover, the 
speed of price adjustment is about 60% higher in more competitive markets. Finally, we show that 
geographic market definitions based on arbitrary measures of distance across sellers, often used by 
researchers and policy makers, result in significant overestimation of the pass-through when the number of 
competitors is small. 
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1. Introduction
A fundamental issue in economics is how firms pass cost shocks (taxes, exchange rates, input 
prices) through to prices. The incidence and pass-through of taxation are classic public policy 
concerns (Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002). The pass-through of exchange rates and tariffs has 
important repercussions on firm productivity and international trade (De Loecker and Koujianou-
Goldberg, 2014). Moreover, the pass-through of input prices is relevant to the analysis of 
oligopolistic markets, price discrimination (Aguirre, Cowan and Vickers, 2010), and merger 
analysis (Jaffe and Weil, 2013). Finally, the cost pass-through is also relevant to the policy debate 
in many industries, such as the health (Cabral, Geruso and Mahoney, 2015) and energy sectors 
(Fabra and Reguant, 2014).  
Theoretical analysis shows that competition is a key determinant of pass-through (Weyl and 
Fabinger, 2013). As for the empirical analysis, there is a well-established line of research 
exploiting variability in costs to infer the magnitude of pass-through.4 In empirical studies, 
competition is generally measured by the number of competitors located within a given 
geographical area around each firm. Variability in the number of close competitors captures some 
important aspects of competition, but does not guarantee that there are no significant substitution 
effects beyond the selected geographical area (for example, some consumers may commute across 
geographical markets for work or family reasons, hence generating substitution effects across 
geographically distant markets). However, while market structure is recognized as an endogenous 
outcome, this type of market definition does not explain why some firms face greater competition 
than others. 
4
 Such variability may come from changes in sales taxes (Barzel, 1976; Poterba, 1996; Besley and Rosen, 1998; 
Marion and Muehlegger, 2011), exchange rate fluctuations (Campa and Goldberg, 2005; Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh 
and Li, 2011), or changes in input prices (Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert, 1997; Genesove and Mullin, 1998; 
Nakamura and Zerom, 2010; Miller, Osborne and Sheu, 2017). 
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Following the literature initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), we measure how pass-
through varies with competition in isolated oligopolistic markets of different sizes. Our data come 
from the retail market for petroleum products (gasoline, unleaded gasoline, diesel, heating oil) on 
the many small islands Greece is known for (Figure 1). Some of these islands are so small that 
they have just a single gas station, while others have two, three, or more. The naturally occurring 
variability in island size provides an exogenous source of variability in the level of competition. 
Islands clearly define local markets, as substitution effects between islands are zero.5  
Along with this unique setting, we take advantage of significant policy changes made by the 
Greek government when, at the beginning of the financial crisis, they increased the excise duty 
on petroleum products three times in 2010. The increments were large and unannounced and 
provide us with an ideal exogenous shock for estimating the pass-through to retail prices. For 
political reasons, heating oil was excluded from the rate hike, as it was considered a necessity 
good. 
Using daily gas station data, we study how the pass-through of the excise duty tax varied across 
markets with different numbers of competitors, while using heating oil as a control group. Thus, 
we can account for unobserved heterogeneity across islands and gas stations, and control for the 
daily aggregate price fluctuations of petroleum products using the control group. We find four 
main results. First, the response to cost shocks is rapid, with an average pass-through of 0.77 after 
10 days from an excise duty change. Second, pass-through increases significantly with the number 
of competitors, and the relation between competition and pass-through is nonlinear. On average, 
the pass-through is 0.44 on monopolistic islands and grows to about 1 on islands with 4 
competitors (measured 10 days from an excise duty change). We found no further effect on pass-
5
 Refueling a car by travelling to a different island is prohibitively expensive, and privately importing fuel in tanks or 
similar containers is dangerous and illegal.  
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through in markets beyond 4 competitors. Third, we find that price adjustments are larger and 
occur more quickly in more competitive markets, which leads to faster pass-through in more 
competitive markets. Fourth, we find that using geographical market definitions based on distance 
across sellers (rather than the island market definition) results in overestimation of pass-through 
in highly concentrated markets. 
Our results contribute to the literature on the transmission of cost shocks to prices, whose 
ultimate objective is to understand the strength of nominal rigidities and the impact of fiscal, 
monetary, and exchange rate policy. Existing evidence on the impact of competition on pass-
through is scarce and somewhat mixed. Miller, Osborne and Sheu (2016) find that increasing 
competition reduces pass-through in a market in which the pass-through is above unity (more 
generally pass-through has been found to be incomplete), but they do not explore its potentially 
nonlinear effects. Cabral, Geruso and Mahoney (2018) study the pass-through of government 
subsidies to premiums of Medicare Advantage plans and find evidence of larger pass-through in 
more competitive markets, with pass-through estimates ranging between 13% and 74%. Alm, 
Sennoga and Skidmore (2009) find a somewhat lower pass-through in rural than in urban gasoline 
markets, which might be related to the different competitive environments. In contrast, Doyle and 
Samphantharak (2008) and Stopler (2017) find that greater brand concentration and market power 
are associated with larger pass-through rates in the gasoline market. 
Our finding of quick response to cost shocks is in line with the results of Bonadio, Fisher and 
Sauré (2016), who show a two-week adjustment period after a large exchange rate shock. Our 
results imply a positive correlation between pass-through and frequency of price adjustments 
across markets with different levels of competition, which is in line with the results of Gopinath 
and Itskhoki (2010). Our results are also related to the literature on the nonlinear effects of 
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competition on firm behavior (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1991) by showing that the pass-through 
quickly converges to competitive levels as the number of competitors grows. Finally, our results 
contribute to the empirical literature on the estimation of cost pass-through and the analysis of 
competition in geographical markets (Houde, 2012). 
2. Theoretical background
Economic theory provides some general results on how competition and other variables interact 
in determining the level of pass-through. Following the conduct parameter approach of Genesove 
and Mullin (1998), Weyl and Fabinger (2013) obtain an equation for the pass-through in 
oligopolistic markets with n symmetrically differentiated firms. Denoting by 𝜖𝐷 = − 𝑝𝑞𝑝′ the
elasticity of demand, they describe the solution to the firm maximization problem by a conduct 
parameter 𝑝−𝑚𝑐(𝑞)𝑝 𝜖𝐷 = 𝜃, where 𝑚𝑐(𝑞) is the marginal cost. 𝜃 captures the intensity of the
competition among firms (𝜃 = 0 in a competitive market and 𝜃 = 1  in a monopolistic market). 
Independently of the specific model considered, the impact of an increase in marginal cost (i.e., 
the pass-through) on the equilibrium price is 
𝜌 = 11+ 𝜃𝜖𝜃+𝜖𝐷−𝜃𝜖𝑆 + 𝜃𝜖𝑚𝑠 . (1) 
The pass-through 𝜌 depends on the conduct parameter 𝜃 and how it varies as the quantity 
produced changes (𝜖𝜃 = 𝜃𝑞𝑑𝜃𝑑𝑞), but also on the determinants of the elasticity of demand 𝜖𝐷, the 
elasticity of the inverse marginal cost curve 𝜖𝑆 (the elasticity of supply), and the curvature of the 
6 
demand function 𝜖𝑚𝑠.6 In general, the sign and magnitude of the pass-through is ambiguous. The
sign and magnitude of the effect of an increase in the conduct parameter on the pass-through can 
be either positive or negative. 
The expression for 𝜌 greatly simplifies in some special cases, highlighting the role of the 
different elements in the denominator of equation (1). The ratio 𝜖𝐷−𝜃𝜖𝑆  links demand heterogeneity 
and pass-through.7 This ratio is equal to zero if the marginal cost is constant. As we will argue in 
Section 3, it is realistic to assume that marginal cost is constant at the firm level, at least in the 
short run, and for the range of quantities typically sold by gas stations in our sample. This suggests 
that demand heterogeneity is unlikely to play a big role in our application. 
A second interesting special case is when 𝜃 is constant. If 𝜃 is constant, then the term 𝜃𝜖𝜃 is also 
equal to 0. The conduct parameter 𝜃 is a constant in a number of prominent models. For example, 𝜃 is equal to 1 in monopoly, equal to 0 in perfect competition and in the Bertrand model, equal to 1𝑛 in the Cournot model.8 Price competition with symmetrically differentiated products implies that 𝜃 = 1 − 𝐴, where 𝐴 ≡ − ∑ 𝜕𝑞𝑗𝜕𝑝𝑖 / 𝜕𝑞𝑖𝜕𝑝𝑖𝑗≠𝑖  is the aggregate diversion ratio, which is a constant if the 
demand is linear in prices. The conduct parameter is assumed to be a constant in most empirical 
applications based on the conduct parameter approach. 
6
 𝜖𝑚𝑠 = 𝑚𝑠𝑚𝑠′𝑞 , where 𝑚𝑠 is the negative of the marginal consumer surplus (𝑚𝑠 = −𝑝′𝑞). 𝜖𝑚𝑠 measures the curvature
of the log of demand (Fabinger and Weyl 2012). If demand is linear then 𝜖𝑚𝑠 = 1, if concave 𝜖𝑚𝑠 < 1, if convex𝜖𝑚𝑠 > 1 (and the opposite is also true).
7
 Note that if 𝜃 = 0, then 𝜌 = 11+(𝜖𝐷/𝜖𝑆), which is the classic formula for tax pass-through in perfect competition. 
8
 The relation between the conduct parameter and the number of firms n illustrates the sense in which an increase in 
the number of firms leads to greater competition. In empirical papers, which typically deal with specific industries, 
the number of firms is often used as a proxy for the intensity of competition. 
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Finally, an important determinant of the pass-through is the demand curvature 𝜖𝑚𝑠. Many 
empirical studies are based on linear demand specifications, directly implying that 𝜖𝑚𝑠 = 1. 
However, it is not uncommon to assume different demand specifications that imply different 
curvature, although there is little guidance in the literature on the sign and magnitude of 𝜖𝑚𝑠. 
If the marginal cost were constant, 𝜃 were constant, and demand were linear, then 𝜌 = 11+𝜃 and 
an increase in the conduct parameter would lead to lower pass-through. Moreover, in this special 
case, the relation between pass-through and theta can be inverted, so estimating the pass-through 
provides information about the conduct parameter. The first assumption is met in several industries 
and is realistic in our application. The second is often considered a reasonable simplification in 
empirical studies, in not putting restrictions on the intensity of competition. However, the third is 
difficult to justify without specific evidence on the second derivative of the demand function. 
Hence, in general, the impact of an increase in competition on pass-through remains largely an 
empirical issue. 
However, if one could test and fail to reject the hypothesis of linear demand in a specific 
application, then one could take this theoretical prediction to the data. One such a test is possible 
for the market for petroleum products on monopoly islands, where simple monopoly pricing theory 
and linear demand implies that the pass-through should be equal to 0.5. Failing to reject this 
hypothesis would support the assumption of linear demand. In Section 6.2, we provide this 
evidence and estimate the pass-through (and hence the conduct parameter) in markets with 
different numbers of competitors. 
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3. Industry background and data
Oil is the main energy source in Greece. In 2010, it accounted for 52% of the country’s total 
primary energy supply, which is substantially higher than the average in most other advanced 
countries (36% in 2010).9 Two companies operate in the Greek refining industry: Hellenic 
Petroleum has three refineries, while Motor Oil Hellas has one. Hellenic Petroleum controls 72% 
of the wholesale market.10 There are ten oil terminals in Greece, seven of which are in the Attica 
area (Athens) and three in the Salonica area (north). In 2010, there were 20 fuel trade companies 
operating in the retail market, the largest of which were EKO (a subsidiary of Hellenic Petroleum), 
Shell, BP, Avin Oil (100% subsidiary of Motor Oil), and Jet Oil. In general, the unit price does not 
depend on the variability in sales at the individual gas station level. The marginal cost of petroleum 
products depends on long-term contracts between gas stations and trade companies. Within the 
observed range of quantities sold, the marginal cost of gas stations is reasonably constant. EU 
member states are required to impose a minimum array of energy taxes, but each member state has 
significant freedom in setting tax rates.11 There are two main taxes that are imposed on energy 
products: excise duties, which is a unit tax rate (€-cents per liter), and the Value Added Tax (VAT), 
which is a percentage tax. In this paper, we focus on changes in excise duties.12 
In 2010, the inability of the Greek government to borrow new funds from the international 
markets led to financial support from euro-area member states and the International Monetary 
Fund. One of the first measures taken by the Greek government to increase tax revenues was to 
increase excise duties on fuel. Excise duties on fuel were raised three times in 2010. Each of these 
9
 International Energy Agency, Energy Policies of IEA Countries, 2011 review. 
10
 The Greek government owns 35.5% of Hellenic Petroleum, but no shares in Motor Oil Hellas. 
11
 EU guideline 2003/96/EU. 
12
 The retail price is determined as 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 = (𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑦 + 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠&𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑠 + 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑠)(1 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇).
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three tax changes was announced and implemented the day after the decision was made, as 
typically happens in order to reduce opportunities for arbitrage. Table 1 shows that the increase 
was very different across products. Remarkably, excise duties for heating oil remained 
unchanged.13 
3.1. Data and measurement of competition 
We combined several datasets for our analysis. First, we obtained daily station-level retail prices 
during 2010. The data on prices was officially collected by the Greek Ministry of Development 
and Competitiveness through a reporting system, which required managers of each petrol station 
to record retail prices daily. The purpose of this system was to facilitate comparison and reduce 
search costs for consumers. The data contains information on five different gasoline products: 
unleaded 95, unleaded 100, super (or leaded gasoline), diesel, and heating oil. Second, we obtained 
socioeconomic (e.g., education, income, number of tourist arrivals) and geographic (size, distance 
from Piraeus14, distance from mainland, number of ports and airports etc.) characteristics of each 
island from the Hellenic Statistical Authority (www.statistics.gr). Third, using company reports 
and Google Maps, we geo-located each gas station. Table 2 reports summary statistics. We 
measure competition using the number of stations on each island.15 The reasoning behind this is 
that the number of competitors on a given island is the result of an entry game. In equilibrium, 
13
 Heating oil is chemically identical to diesel (although a different color) and is sold by the same gasoline stations 
throughout the country. A lower excise duty is applied to it, as it is considered a necessity, since the vast majority of 
households use heating oil rather than gas or electricity during the winter months. 
14
 The primary distribution center for gasoline products in Greece 
15
 We also obtained independent information on the number of gas stations on each island from Yellow Pages data, 
which covers all stations on every island. Industry reports and Yellow Pages data for different years show that entry 
and exit was essentially zero in this period. Using data on number of reporting stations or a different period does not 
affect the results.  
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larger islands can sustain more competitors, each of them enjoying smaller markups (Bresnahan 
and Reiss, 1991). 
We focus on small islands, with fewer than 8 stations. There are two main reasons for this. First, 
small islands are sparsely inhabited and physically small. The median island in our sample has 
about 2,500 inhabitants, and it is just 86 Km2 (Table 2). Hence, consumers plausibly have close to 
perfect information about each station’ prices and can reach all of them quite easily. Second, 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) find that competitive conduct changes quickly as the number of 
incumbents increases. They find that the most variation in conduct occurs with the entry of the 
second or third firm. Hence, selecting islands with fewer than 8 firms provides a sufficiently large 
range to capture the main effects of competition. 
Different measures of competition are possible for islands with more than one gas station. 
Having geo-located each station, we also compute measures of competition based on the number 
of competitors within a 3 Km driving distance from each station, a 3 Km radius, or alternatively, 
a 5-minute driving time. These are conventional methods of measuring competition when there is 
no natural boundary across markets. In Section 6.4, we compare the results obtained using these 
alternative measures. Finally, there is very little to no brand concentration at the island level. In all 
islands in our sample, gas stations are either franchisees of different brands or independently 
owned. Hence, the number of gas stations on each island realistically captures the number of 
competitors on that island. 
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4. Preliminary evidence
Islands vary in size and number of gas stations. Figure 2 shows that the larger the island (either 
in terms of land area (Km2) or population), the larger the number of stations. On average, 
monopolies have about 1,100 inhabitants, while islands with 7 stations have about 9,800 (Figure 
2). In terms of physical size, monopolies are on average 54 Km2, while islands with 7 stations are 
about 110 Km2. Prices vary significantly across islands. For example, Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of the average price for diesel and heating oil across islands.16 On average, prices tend 
to fall as the number of competitors increases. Taken together, Figures 2 and 3 show that larger 
islands tend to support more competitive markets, thus leading to lower prices. 
5. Identification and empirical methodology
We use a difference in difference approach, and we start by estimating the following model: 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜌𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡      (1) 
where 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡 denotes the retail price of product 𝑘, on island 𝑖, in gas station 𝑠, on day 𝑡 ∈{𝜏 − 1, 𝜏 + 𝛿}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three excise duty changes and 𝛿 = 1, … ,10 is the 
length of the adjustment period considered. 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡 is the excise duty, and the coefficient 𝜌 captures 
the tax pass-through. Finally, the model includes product-gas station and day fixed effects. This 
econometric approach follows a long literature on difference in difference estimators and is based 
16
 The range of prices in Figure 3 is about €0.15 for both diesel and heating oil. 
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on the comparison of prices on two different dates (before and after the policy change) for a 
treatment (gasoline and diesel) and a control group (heating oil).17  
We then focus on the interaction between taxes and competition and estimate the model: 𝑃𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝜌(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑍𝑖)𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑘𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝑠 + 𝛽𝑡 + 𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡     (2) 
where the pass-through 𝜌(𝑛𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) is a linear function 𝜌(𝑛𝑖, 𝑍𝑖) = 𝜌0 + 𝜌1𝑛𝑖 + 𝜌2𝑍𝑖  of the number
of competitors 𝑛𝑖 and other island specific characteristics 𝑍𝑖. Alternatively, the relation between 
pass-through 𝜌 and number of stations 𝑗 can be non-parametrically estimated replacing 𝜌(𝑛𝑖) =∑ 𝜌𝑗𝐼(𝑛𝑖 = 𝑗)𝑗 , where 𝐼 is an indicator variable for each observed number of gas stations.
The identifying assumption is 𝐸(𝑒𝑘𝑖𝑠𝑡|𝑋) = 0, where X is the matrix of all covariates. This 
OLS condition is reasonably met in our difference in difference framework. In fact, the tax increase 
was not anticipated and the price of the different petroleum products tended to follow the same 
trend before the policy changes (Figure 4). In summary, the differential changes in excise duties 
across products (Table 1) provide identification of the tax pass-through, while fixed effects capture 
island- and station-specific characteristics as well as the macroeconomic shocks that affected the 
whole economy, while the control group accounts for aggregate changes in the prices of petroleum 
products. Although variables in Z capture the potential effect of other observed island 
characteristics on pass-through, in Section 6.2 we will also report IV estimates of model (2), where 
exogenous variability in market size is used to estimate the impact of the number of competitors 
on pass-through. Following the literature on equilibrium entry in oligopoly markets (Bresnahan 
and Reiss, 1991; Berry, 1992; Mazzeo, 2002; Toivanen and Waterson, 2005), the rationale for the 
17
 Early applications of this methodology are found in Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Card (1992), and Card and 
Krueger (1994, 2000); more recent applications in industrial economics include, for example, Ashenfelter et al. 
(2013) and Genakos, Koutroumpis and Pagliero (2018). 
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IV approach is that market size is a crucial determinant of entry and competition, while it is 
arguably uncorrelated with unobservable determinants of the pass-through (such as demand 
convexity). Hence, the IV approach assumes that market size can be excluded from Z, while being 
correlated with measures of competition. This second assumption can be tested, and it is verified 
in our results described in the next section. 
6. Empirical results
6.1. The estimated pass-through 
Figure 5 shows the difference between the average price of diesel and heating oil around the 
three changes in excise duties. The solid lines represent linear regressions separately estimated 
before and after the tax change. Similar results are obtained for the other products (see Figure A1 
in the appendix). There is a significant jump corresponding to the event date. Moreover, prices 
tend to increase during the days following the tax changes as stations progressively adjust their 
prices during this period.18 On average, 59% of product-station specific prices are adjusted within 
three days, 88% within 7 days, and 94% within 10 days of the tax change. 
The average pass-through on a given date depends on two margins. The extensive margin is the 
number of stations having adjusted their price by a given date. The intensive margin is the size of 
the price increase for stations actually changing their prices. Accordingly, we can use equations 
(1) and (2) to estimate the “average” pass-through or the “conditional” pass-through, using 
respectively all the data or only the data for firms that have changed their prices by a given date. 
For long enough adjustment periods, the two definitions coincide, as all stations have adjusted 
18
 There are no significant changes in the price of heating oil around the changes in excise duties (see Figure A2 in 
the appendix). 
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their prices. However, for shorter adjustment periods, the two definitions might substantially 
differ. We start by reporting results for the conditional pass-through for a 10-day adjustment period 
and, in Section 6.3, we will compare the conditional and average pass-throughs for shorter 
adjustment periods. The 10-day adjustment period is chosen so that it is close enough to the change 
in excise duty, but is also long enough for almost all of the gas station to have changed their 
prices.19 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of model (1). In column 1-3, we consider each policy 
change separately, and in column 4 we pool all the data. The pass-through is 0.77, with a standard 
error of 0.07. This pass-through is slightly smaller but within the range of the unit pass-through 
estimated by Marion and Muehlegger (2011), Chouinard and Perloff (2007), Doyle and 
Samphantharak (2008), Alm, Sennoga and Skidmore (2009) for US state taxes on petroleum 
products and by Poterba (1996) for sales taxes on clothing. This suggests that the market for 
petroleum products in our sample of islands does not operate very differently from other markets 
studied in the literature, which is important for the external validity of our results. The lower value 
of pass-through in our case is likely related to the fact that many gas stations in our data have a 
significant degree of market power. It is this topic that we explore next. 
6.2. Pass-through and competition 
Table 4, column 1 reports the results of model (2), allowing for the interaction between tax 
changes and number of competitors. In column 2, we add controls for the interaction of excise 
duty changes and island characteristics, such as income, education, number of ports and airports, 
19
 The likely cause of delayed price adjustments is the slow process of refilling gas stations in relatively remote areas. 
Refilling is done by ships that leave from Piraeus (the main port near Athens) and follow a predetermined route across 
the Aegean Sea. This process is determined by the geographical dispersion of islands in the Aegean Sea and is 
independent of the excise duty changes and the size of the island (or other observable characteristics). 
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distance from Piraeus and number of tourist arrivals. The pass-through significantly increases with 
competition. Column 4 shows that the relation between competition and pass-through is concave. 
This result is robust controlling for interactions of excise duty changes and covariates (column 
5).20 Table 4, columns 3 and 6 report the IV estimates, where the instruments are the size of each 
island (measured by population) and its square. First stage results (reported in Table A3 in the 
appendix) are highly significant, showing a strong correlation between market size and number of 
competitors. Overall, the impact of competition on pass-through is positive and decreasing as the 
number of competitors grows. 
The non-linear relation between competition and pass-through is more clearly described in 
Figure 6, which shows the results of a non-parametric specification (reported in Table 5, column 
1). The pass-through is about 0.44 in monopoly islands and increases up to about 1 in islands with 
four competitors. The relation between pass-through and number of competitors is flat thereafter. 
The quick convergence to a unit pass-through is in line with the results of Bresnahan and Reiss 
(1991) that show that entry thresholds converge quite quickly; in other words, after three or four 
firms, an additional entrant does not affect competition much. 
Note that the estimated pass-through for monopoly islands is not significantly different from 
the 0.5 pass-through predicted by a monopoly model with linear demand.21 This provides direct 
evidence that demand convexity is not significant in monopoly islands and supports the assumption 
that demand convexity is also not relevant in markets with more competitors. Under this 
assumption, as we argued in Section 2, the conduct parameter 𝜃 can be recovered from the 
20
 Table A1 and A2 in the appendix provide results introducing interactions one by one.  
21
 The pass-through estimated for monopoly islands can be used to test the null of linear demand. In fact, in monopoly 
markets, 𝜌 = 1/(1 + 1𝜀𝑚𝑠), where 𝜀𝑚𝑠 = 1 for linear demand.
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estimated pass-through for different market configurations, since  𝜃 = 1−𝜌𝜌 . Figure 7 shows the 𝜃 
implied by our pass-through estimates as the number of competitors increases: it sharply decreases 
as the number of competitors increases and is close to zero from about four competitors on. 
More precisely, the average point estimate of the conduct parameter beyond four competitors 
is 0.05. Assuming a demand elasticity between -1 and -0.5, this implies a profit margin between 5 
and 10%.22 While we do not have direct evidence on retail profit margins in our sample of small 
islands, interviews with industry professionals suggest that profit margins throughout Greece 
(including the more competitive markets on the mainland) are about 5%. Hence, our estimates 
seem to be broadly in line with the market reality. 
6.3. Pass-through and speed of adjustment 
The results shown in Tables 3 and 4 are obtained with a 10-day adjustment period. Table 6, 
column 1 reports the estimated average pass-through for different adjustment periods. Shorter 
adjustment periods imply a lower average pass-through, as stations progressively adjust their 
prices. Figure 8 shows that the average pass-through converges to the conditional pass-through. 
The conditional pass-through does not significantly depend on the length of the adjustment period 
(Table 6, column 2). The speed of convergence of the average and the conditional pass-through is 
in line with the relatively fast exchange rate pass-through measured by Bonadio, Fischer and Sauré 
(2016). Still, the speed of adjustment in our data is slower than that observed in other studies of 
the gasoline market (for example, Knittel, Meiselman and Stock, 2016). This can be partly 
22
 Although estimates of the elasticity of demand for gasoline vary, there is evidence suggesting that aggregate demand 
at the country level is rigid (Brons, Nijkamp, Pels, and Rietveld, 2008).  
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explained by some specificities of our sample. In particular, the average pass-through in our 
sample can be affected by the delays in refilling gas stations on relatively remote islands.23 
Does the speed of adjustment depend on competition? This is an important question, as it relates 
to understanding how quickly prices adjust to cost shocks in the economy. In imperfectly 
competitive markets, we cannot expect an equal speed of adjustment in markets with different 
level of competition (Gopinath and Itskhoki, 2010). We split the islands into two groups: those 
with 1 to 3 competitors (“low competition”) and those with 4 or more competitors (“high 
competition”). Table 7 and Figure 9 report the average and the conditional pass-throughs for the 
two groups for different adjustment periods. The average pass-through is significantly higher for 
islands with more competitors. At 𝑡 + 1, the pass-through in more competitive markets is about 
0.16 higher (about double) than in less competitive markets. At 𝑡 + 10, the pass-through in more 
competitive markets is about 0.3 (or 60%) higher. The conditional pass-through is stable over time 
and significantly larger in more competitive markets. Finally, Figure 10 shows the cumulative 
frequency of price changes for the two groups and provides direct evidence that stations in more 
competitive markets react more quickly to changes in excise duties. Hence, more competitive 
markets adjust faster to cost shocks, partly because the conditional pass-through is larger and partly 
because price changes are faster. 
These results imply a positive correlation between pass-through and frequency of price 
adjustments across islands (with different levels of competition). This is consistent with the results 
of Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010), who find a positive correlation between frequency of price 
adjustments and magnitude of exchange rate pass-throughs across sectors. Our results are also in 
23
 Using a probit model, we find that the probability of a price change is not systematically related to any island 
characteristic such as size, population, or distance from Piraeus.  
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line with their theoretical model, in which firms in more competitive markets (i.e., with higher 
residual demand elasticity) are those with higher frequency of price adjustments and higher pass-
throughs. 
6.4. Alternative market definitions 
Without a clear definition of market boundaries or detailed traffic data (Houde, 2012), the 
literature has typically defined markets based on the distance between gas stations (Shepard, 1991; 
Barron, Taylor and Umbeck, 2004; Eckert and West, 2005; Hosken, McMillan and Taylor, 2008). 
While realistic, this approach cannot guarantee the absence of substitution effects with firms 
outside the geographical area considered. In our application, the definition of markets is simpler. 
Monopoly islands are unambiguously classified as such. In islands with more stations, there can 
only be substitution effects among firms on the same island. Given the small scale of these islands, 
some substitution is likely to exist among all stations on the same island. 
However, we followed standard market definitions and computed for each station the number 
of competitors within a 3-kilometer radius, 3 and 5-kilometer driving distance, and 10-minute drive 
(using Google maps). While these three procedures obviously do not affect monopoly islands, they 
may reduce the number of competitors for stations on larger islands. We then estimate the pass-
through using model (2) and our new market definitions. Table 5, columns 2-4, reports the 
estimated coefficients, and Figure 11 shows the estimated relation between pass-through and 
number of competitors. Overall, monopolies, duopolies, and triopolies according to the new 
definitions show a significantly higher pass-through than those previously estimated (also 
indicated by the black line in Figure 11 for comparison). For example, the 3Km driving distance 
definition implies that the pass-through is 70, 64, and 36% higher for markets with one, two, and 
three firms respectively. The most likely explanation for this overestimation is the existence of 
19 
substitution effects across sellers at the boundary of the market. This bias seems to become 
negligible in markets with at least four sellers (similar results are obtained with the other market 
definitions). 
7. Concluding Remarks
The paper provides new empirical evidence on the effects of competition on pass-through in 
oligopolistic markets with a small number of firms. We contribute to the growing literature on 
pass-through by showing that pass-through increases with competition in a nonlinear fashion, 
growing from 0.44 for monopoly markets to 1 for markets with four competitors or more. 
Moreover, the pass-through and the frequency of price adjustments are higher in more competitive 
markets. We also find that conventional definitions of markets that are based on distance between 
sellers lead to overestimation of the pass-through for markets with up to four competitors. Since 
these definitions are often used in policy analysis, care should be taken when studying oligopolistic 
markets. The relation between competition and pass-through generally depends on the second 
derivative of the demand function, which is difficult to estimate in practice. Still, the evidence 
from monopoly islands suggests that demand curvature does not play a big role in our data. Hence, 
we can use estimates of the pass-through to provide novel evidence on the relation between the 
conduct parameter and competition. 
20 
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FIGURE 1: GREEK ISLANDS
Notes: The main figure shows the map of Greece, with the two smaller figures showing more detailed maps of the Cyclades and Dodecanese islands.
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FIGURE 2: COMPETITION AND MARKET SIZE
Notes: The figure on the left plots the number of gas stations and island size (measured in square km), whereas the figure on the right plots the number of gas stations and island population.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development and the Hellenic Statistical Authority.
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FIGURE 3: COMPETITION AND PRICES
Notes: The figure on the left plots the average price of diesel, the figure on the right plots the average price of heating oil for islands with different number of competitors (January 2010).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 4: AVERGE PRICES OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS BEFORE THE EXCISE DUTY CHANGES.
Notes:Thefourfiguresplotaverageretailpricesofthedifferentpetroleumproducts(clockwisefrom
left:Unleaded95,Super,Unleaded100,Diesel)andofheatingoilduringJanuary2010.
Source:Authors’calculationsbasedondatafromtheGreekMinistryofDevelopment.
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FIGURE 5: AVERAGE PRICE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DIESEL AND HEATING OIL.
Notes: The three figures plot the average difference between diesel and heating oil ten days before and after the changes in excise duties for each of the three increases as detailed in Table 1. Figure 1 in the Appendix plots the same
differences for the three other products (Unleaded95, Unleaded100, Super) for each of the three tax changes. Also, Figure 2 in the Appendix plots the average prices for diesel and heating oil separately.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 6: PASS-THROUGH AND COMPETITION.
Notes: The figure plots the estimated coefficients from Table 5, column 1, together with the 95% confidence interval.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 7: IMPLIED CONDUCT PARAMETER
Notes: The figure plots the conduct parameter implied by our estimates (assuming constant marginal cost and linear demand).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on estimated results.
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FIGURE 8: PASS-THROUGH AND SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT
Notes: The figure plots the estimated coefficients from Table 6. The average pass-through is estimated using all the data. The conditional pass-through is
estimated using observations for station-product combinations that have changed the price at least once between τ and τ+δ, where τ is the date of the excise
duty change and δ=1,...,10.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 9: SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT AND COMPETITION.
Notes: The figure plots the average and conditional pass-through on islands with 1-3 (low competition) and 4-7 (high competition) gas stations. The
average pass-through is estimated using all the data. The conditional pass-through is estimated using observations for station-product combinations that
have changed the price at least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+𝛿, where 𝜏 is the date of the excise duty change and 𝛿=1,...,10. Estimated coefficients are reported in
Table 7.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 10: CUMULATIVE FREQUENCY OF PRICE CHANGES.
Notes: The figure plots the cumulative frequency of station-product combinations that changed their prices between 𝜏 and 𝜏+𝛿, where 𝜏 is the date of the
excise duty change and 𝛿=1,...,10, on islands with 1-3 (low competition) and 4-7 (high competition) gas stations.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE 11: ALTERNATIVE MARKET DEFINITIONS.
Notes: The figure plots the estimated coefficients from Table 5 (column 1 vs. columns 2-5).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development, Eurostat and Google Maps.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type of energy product Unleaded 95 Unleaded 100 Diesel Super (leaded) Heating oil
10-Feb-10 29% 29% 17% 29% 0%
04-Mar-10 15% 15% 9% 15% 0%
03-May-10 10% 10% 8% 10% 0%
TABLE 1 - EXCISE DUTY TAX CHANGES (%Δ)
Notes: The table reports the changes in excise duties by product.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Eurostat (rates and structure of excise duties for energy products).
34
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Median 10th percentile 90th percentile
Unleaded 95 126 12.4 125 107 142
Unleaded 100 136 12.7 136 119 152
Super 127 12.5 125 110 143
Diesel 107 8.5 106 96 118
Heating oil 62 4.1 62 57 67
Size 103 60 86 35 195
Population 3,222 2,939 2,523 765 7,917
Ports 2 1 1 1 3
Airports 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.0
Arrivals 112,046 168,061 58,748 13,188 296,016
Distance from Piraeus 123 61 111 45 210
Income 17,522 2,336 17,219 15,462 20,471
Education (tertiary) 11% 2% 10% 9% 13%
TABLE 2 - SUMMARY STATISTICS
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development, the Hellenic Statistical Authority and Eurostat.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist
Sample Excise change 1 Excise change 2 Excise change 3 All excise changes
Taxit 0.690*** 1.076*** 0.661*** 0.767***
(0.087) (0.111) (0.097) (0.069)
Observations 283 267 365 915
Within R2 0.743 0.757 0.662 0.931
Clusters 37 41 55 57
Time FE yes yes yes yes
Product × Station FE yes yes yes yes
Excise change × Product type FE yes
Excise change × Station FE yes
TABLE 3 - EXCISE DUTY PASS-THROUGH.
Notes: The dependent variable is the retail price of product k, on island i , in gas station s, and day 𝑡 ∈ {𝜏 − 1, 𝜏 + 10}, where 𝜏 is the date of each
of the three excise duty changes. The pass-through is estimated using observations for station-product combinations that have changed the price at
least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+10 (conditional pass-through). Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below
coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Estimation method FE FE IV FE FE IV
Dependent variable Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist
Sample All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes
Taxit 0.449*** -0.736 0.464*** 0.139 -0.601 -0.702
(0.091) (1.040) (0.104) (0.186) (0.897) (0.466)
Taxit × Number of competitorss 0.086*** 0.082** 0.082*** 0.289*** 0.265 0.821***
(0.020) (0.034) (0.020) (0.100) (0.172) (0.294)
Taxit × Number of competitorss2 -0.025** -0.023 -0.090**
(0.011) (0.018) (0.037)
First stage F-test (Number of competitors) 54.63*** 108.01***
First stage F-test (Number of competitors2) 42.01***
Within R2 0.937 0.939 0.939 0.939
Observations 915 915 879 915 915 879
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Product × Station FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excise change × Product type FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excise change × Station FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Additional controls (interactions with income, 
education, number of ports, and airports, distance 
from Piraeus and tourist arrivals).
yes yes
TABLE 4 - PASS-THROUGH AND COMPETITION.
Notes: The dependent variable is the retail price of product k, on island i, in gas station s, and day 𝑡∈{𝜏−1, 𝜏+10}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three excise duty changes. The pass-through is estimated using observations for
station-product combinations that have changed the price at least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+10 (conditional pass-through). Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development, the Hellenic Statistical Authority and Eurostat.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist
Market definition:  
Island
Market definition:    
3 Km driving distance
Market definition:  
3 Km radius
Market definition:       
10 min driving distance
Market definition:    
5 Km driving distance
Taxit × One competitor 0.438*** 0.748*** 0.695*** 0.701*** 0.688***
(0.133) (0.082) (0.067) (0.073) (0.071)
Taxit × Two competitors 0.580*** 0.951*** 1.046*** 0.915*** 0.972***
(0.074) (0.053) (0.042) (0.098) (0.100)
Taxit × Three competitors 0.758*** 1.034*** 0.968*** 0.875*** 0.890***
(0.095) (0.086) (0.079) (0.076) (0.071)
Taxit × Four competitors 0.983*** 1.020*** 1.034*** 0.963*** 1.009***
(0.083) (0.107) (0.086) (0.138) (0.106)
Taxit × Five competitors 0.952*** 0.829*** 0.895*** 0.916*** 0.922***
(0.098) (0.127) (0.071) (0.053) (0.050)
Taxit × Seven competitors 0.923*** 0.794*** 0.814***
(0.048) (0.119) (0.127)
Observations 915 609 609 499 537
Within R2 0.939 0.966 0.967 0.966 0.966
Clusters 57 39 39 39 39
Time FE yes yes yes yes yes
Product × Station FE yes yes yes yes yes
Excise incident × Product type FE yes yes yes yes yes
Excise incident × Station FE yes yes yes yes yes
TABLE 5 - PASS-THOURGH AND COMPETITION: ALTERNATIVE MARKET DEFINITIONS
Notes: The dependent variable is the retail price of product k, on island i, in gas station s, and day 𝑡∈{𝜏−1, 𝜏+10}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three excise duty changes. The pass-through is estimated
using observations for station-product combinations that have changed the price at least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+10 (conditional pass-through). *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development, the Hellenic Statistical Authority, Eurostat and Google Maps.
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(1) (2)
Estimation method FE FE
Dependent variable Priceist Priceist
Sample All excise changes All excise changes
Average pass-through Conditional pass-through
Taxit 0.232*** 0.805***
(τ-1, τ+1) (0.074) (0.097)
Taxit 0.339*** 0.816***
(τ-1, τ+2) (0.087) (0.127)
Taxit 0.368*** 0.771***
(τ-1, τ+3) (0.088) (0.116)
Taxit 0.421*** 0.741***
(τ-1, τ+4) (0.088) (0.106)
Taxit 0.417*** 0.727***
(τ-1, τ+5) (0.088) (0.105)
Taxit 0.596*** 0.732***
(τ-1, τ+6) (0.083) (0.080)
Taxit 0.618*** 0.687***
(τ-1, τ+7) (0.081) (0.077)
Taxit 0.667*** 0.727***
(τ-1, τ+8) (0.080) (0.076)
Taxit 0.707*** 0.759***
(τ-1, τ+9) (0.075) (0.071)
Taxit 0.713*** 0.767***
(τ-1, τ+10) (0.073) (0.069)
TABLE 6 - SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT
Notes: Every coefficient comes from a separate regression, where we vary the time window. The dependent variable is the
retail price of product k, on island i, in gas station s, and day 𝑡 ∈ {𝜏 − 1, 𝜏 + 𝛿}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three
excise duty changes and 𝛿 = 1,… , 10. The average pass-through (column 1) is estimated using all the data. The
conditional pass-through (column 2) is estimated using observations for station-product combinations that have changed
the price at least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+𝛿. Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses
below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development and Eurostat.
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PANEL A. AVERAGE PASS-THROUGH.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist
Sample All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes
(τ-1, τ+1) (τ-1, τ+2) (τ-1, τ+3) (τ-1, τ+4) (τ-1, τ+5) (τ-1, τ+6) (τ-1, τ+7) (τ-1, τ+8) (τ-1, τ+9) (τ-1, τ+10)
Taxit × Low competition 0.136* 0.200** 0.198** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.410*** 0.443*** 0.456*** 0.519*** 0.531***
(1-3 competitors) (0.070) (0.091) (0.087) (0.082) (0.082) (0.086) (0.082) (0.083) (0.076) (0.076)
Taxit × High competition 0.301*** 0.433*** 0.500*** 0.534*** 0.534*** 0.747*** 0.766*** 0.831*** 0.855*** 0.856***
(4-7 competitors) (0.094) (0.104) (0.105) (0.108) (0.108) (0.097) (0.095) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083)
PANEL B. CONDITIONAL PASS-THROUGH.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist Priceist
Sample All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes
(τ-1, τ+1) (τ-1, τ+2) (τ-1, τ+3) (τ-1, τ+4) (τ-1, τ+5) (τ-1, τ+6) (τ-1, τ+7) (τ-1, τ+8) (τ-1, τ+9) (τ-1, τ+10)
Taxit × Low competition 0.639*** 0.614*** 0.528*** 0.528*** 0.523*** 0.509*** 0.486*** 0.502*** 0.552*** 0.565***
(1-3 competitors) (0.138) (0.164) (0.142) (0.119) (0.117) (0.092) (0.078) (0.078) (0.071) (0.069)
Taxit × High competition 0.888*** 0.952*** 0.966*** 0.953*** 0.932*** 0.939*** 0.886*** 0.926*** 0.948*** 0.951***
(4-7 competitors) (0.083) (0.087) (0.067) (0.065) (0.067) (0.073) (0.080) (0.068) (0.065) (0.064)
TABLE 7 - SPEED OF ADJUSTMENT AND COMPETITION 
Notes: The dependent variable is the retail price of product k, on island i, in gas station s, and day 𝑡∈{𝜏−1, 𝜏+𝛿}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three excise duty changes and 𝛿=1,…,10. The average pass-through is estimated using all the data. The conditional pass-through is estimated using observations for station-product combinations that have changed the price at
least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+𝛿. Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.The dependent variable is the retail price of product i, in gas station s, and day t. Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below coefficients:
*significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development and Eurostat.
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FIGURE A1: AVERAGE PRICE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNLEADED 95, UNLEADED 100,  SUPER AND  HEATING OIL. 
Notes: The figures plot the average difference between unleaded95, unleaded100, super and heating oil ten days before and after the changes in excise duties for each of the three increases as detailed in Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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FIGURE A2: AVERAGE PRICES BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXCISE DUTIES CHANGES (DIESEL vs HEATING OIL)
Notes: The figures plot the evolution of average prices for diesel and heating oil separately ten days before and after the changes in excise duties for each of the three increases as detailed in Table 1.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist
Sample All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes
Taxit 0.449*** -0.424 0.258 0.447*** 0.470*** 0.398*** 0.475*** -0.736
(0.091) (0.391) (0.262) (0.092) (0.126) (0.134) (0.093) (1.040)
Taxit × Number of competitorss 0.086*** 0.075*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.086*** 0.079*** 0.058** 0.082**
(0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.027) (0.034)
Taxit × Incomes 0.048** 0.042
(×1000) (0.019) (0.044)
Taxit × Educations 1.876 4.223
(1.870) (3.062)
Taxit × Touristss -0.092 -0.379*
(×1000000) (0.138) (0.162)
Taxit × Distance from Piraeus -0.092 -0.242
(×1000) (0.138) (1.223)
Taxit × Number of portss 0.045 0.009
(0.059) (0.069)
Taxit × Number of airportss 0.183* 0.054
(0.106) (0.208)
Observations 915 915 915 915 915 915 915 915
Within R2 0.937 0.939 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.937 0.938 0.939
Clusters 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Estimation method FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
Dependent variable Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist Pricekist
Sample All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes
Taxit 0.139 -0.237 -0.016 0.122 -0.086 0.059 0.190 -0.601
(0.186) (0.474) (0.290) (0.194) (0.285) (0.194) (0.197) (0.897)
Taxit × Number of competitorss 0.289*** 0.214 0.286*** 0.305*** 0.351*** 0.289*** 0.247** 0.265
(0.100) (0.157) (0.098) (0.108) (0.122) (0.096) (0.114) (0.172)
Taxit × Number of competitorss2 -0.025** -0.017 -0.025** -0.026** -0.033** -0.026** -0.023** -0.023
(0.011) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018)
Taxit × Incomes 0.026 0.022
(×1000) (0.033) (0.038)
Taxit × Educations 1.574 2.719
(1.921) (3.260)
Taxit × Touristss -0.163 -0.315*
(×1000000) (0.133) (0.180)
Taxit × Distance from Piraeus 1.144 0.453
(×1000) (0.784) (1.459)
Taxit × Number of portss 0.060 0.034
(0.054) (0.067)
Taxit × Number of airportss 0.143 2.719
(0.113) (3.260)
Observations 915 915 915 915 915 915 915 915
Within R2 0.937 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939 0.939
Clusters 57 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
TABLE Α1 - PASS-THROUGH AND COMPETITION - ROBUSTNESS
TABLE Α2 - PASS-THROUGH AND COMPETITION - ROBUSTNESS
Notes: The dependent variable is the retail price of product k, on island i, in gas station s, and day 𝑡 ∈ {𝜏 − 1, 𝜏 + 10}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three excise duty changes. The pass-through is estimated using observations for station-product combinations
that have changed the price at least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+10 (conditional pass-through). Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development and Eurostat.
Notes: The dependent variable is the retail price of product k, on island i, in gas station s, and day 𝑡 ∈ {𝜏 − 1, 𝜏 + 10}, where 𝜏 is the date of each of the three excise duty changes. The pass-through is estimated using observations for station-product combinations
that have changed the price at least once between 𝜏 and 𝜏+10 (conditional pass-through). Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development and Eurostat.
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(1) (2) (3)
Estimation method IV- First Stage IV- First Stage IV- First Stage
Dependent variable Taxit × Number of competitorss Taxit × Number of competitorss Taxit × Number of competitorss2
Sample All excise changes All excise changes All excise changes
Taxit 1.692*** 0.647** -5.668**
(0.299) (0.250) (2.161)
Taxit × Populations 0.513*** 1.149*** 8.246***
(×1000) (0.069) (0.101) (1.131)
Taxit × Populations2 -0.057*** -0.358***
(×1000000) (0.010) (0.100)
F-test 54.63*** 108.01*** 42.01***
Within R2 0.814 0.871 0.801
Observations 879 879 879
Time FE yes yes yes
Product × Station FE yes yes yes
Excise change × Product type FE yes yes yes
Excise change × Station FE yes yes yes
TABLE  A3 - FIRST STAGE RESULTS OF PASS-THROUGH AND COMPETITION
Notes: The table reports the first stage results for Table 4, columns 3 and 6. Standard errors clustered at the gas station level are reported in parentheses below coefficients: *significant at
10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the Greek Ministry of Development, the Hellenic Statistical Authority and Eurostat.
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